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Abstract 
The study evaluates the efficiency of government intervention using a vertical structured 
model including imperfectly competitive agricultural input markets, the bread grain market, 
and the imperfectly competitive food industry.  To test for policy efficiency the actually 
observed bread grain policy is compared to a hypothetical efficient policy.  To account for the 
sensitivity of the results in regard to the model parameter values computer-intensive 
simulation procedures and surface response functions are utilized.   
 
Keywords:  agricultural policy, efficient combination of policy instruments, statistical welfare 
analysis 
 




Die vorliegende Studie untersucht die Effizienz der Brotgetreidepolitik in Österreich.  Dazu 
wird eine vertikal gegliedertes Model entwickelt, daß sowohl den Brotgetreidemarkt selbst, 
als auch unter unvollkommenen Wettbewerb agierende vorgelagerte Faktormärkte und den 
nachgelagerten Lebensmittelsektor berücksichtigt.  Um die Brotgetreidepolitik auf ihre 
Effizienz hin zu testen, wird die tatsächlich beobachtete Politik mit einer hypothetischen 
optimalen Politik verglichen.  Der Abhängigkeit der Ergebnisse von den gewählten 
Modelparameterwerten wird mit Hilfe von computerintensive Simulationstechniken und 
„surface response“ Funktionen Rechnung getragen. 
 
Schlüsselwörter: Agrarpolitik, effiziente Kombination von Politikinstrumenten, statistische 
Wohlfahrtsanalyse   3
1.  Introduction 
As a rule, governments defend their policy as efficiently meeting stated objectives.  The aim 
of this study is to take this to an empirical test.  In particular, it is analyzed if the market 
interventions into the Austrian bread grain market before the EU accession were designed to 
efficiently meet the main stated objectives.  To do so, the actually observed policy is 
compared to a hypothetical optimal policy using the same instruments, but at optimal levels.   
In the next section the official objectives relevant to the past bread gain policy in 
Austria and the policy instruments are reviewed.  In Section 3 a vertically-structured model 
including imperfectly competitive agricultural input markets, the bread grain market, and the 
imperfectly competitive food industry is developed.  Since the results crucially depend on the 
model parameters a range rather than (one or a few) specific values are derived for each 
model parameter in Section 4.  In Section 5 the simulation model and assumed parameter 
ranges are used to test for the efficiency of the bread grain policy.  Section 6 provides a 
sensitivity analysis of the results.  Section 7 gives a summary and discussion.   
 
2.  Objectives and instruments of bread grain policy 
Thus, official objectives of farm policy as stated in national agricultural legislation are 
manifold there also appears to be a high degree of unanimity about the goals of agricultural 
policy among developed countries.  Following Winters (1987, 1990) in analyzing the 
objectives of agricultural support in OECD countries one may identify four categories of farm 
policy goals:  i) support and stabilization of farm income;  ii) self-sufficiency with agricultural 
(food) products;  iii) regional, community and family farm aspects;  iv) the environment.  
There is not much doubt among agricultural policy analysts that farm income support has 
been the most important goal over the last decades (Josling, 1974; Gardner, 1992).     4
In general, Austrian agricultural legislation is not different from other developed 
countries.  The overall goals of agricultural policy are stated in paragraph 1 of the 
"Landwirtschaftsgesetz" (Agricultural Status) (see Gatterbauer et al. 1993, Ortner, 1997) and 
perfectly fit in the four categories mentioned above.   
The particular objectives of bread grain market interventions are stated in the 
"Marktordnungsgesetz" and can be summarized as (Astl,1989, p. 88;  Mannert, 1991, p. 74):  
i) safeguarding domestic production,  ii) stabilizing flour and bread prices;  and iii) securing a 
sufficient supply and quality of bread grain, bread grain products and animal feedstuffs.   
Utilized policy instruments to meet stated policy objectives can be illustrated by means 
of Figure 1 with Dfo being the domestic demand for bread grain for food production and D 
being the total domestic demand for bread grain including demand for feeding purposes.  
Initial domestic supply is represented by S and supply including a fertilizer tax by St.  World 
market price is assumed to be perfectly elastic at Pw.  Farmers obtain a high floor price (PD) 
for a specific contracted quantity (or quota) QQ.  Since farmers have to pay a co-responsibility 
levy (CLPD) the net producer price is PD - CLPD.  Quantities, which exceed the quota can be 
delivered at a reduced price PE.  Again farmers’ net floor price is PE - CLPE, with CLPE being 
the co-responsibility levy for bread grain beyond the quota.  Food processors have to buy 
bread grain at the high price PD, while the price of bread grain for feeding purposes is PE.  
Therefore, domestic demand for bread grain in food production is QD, domestic demand for 
feeding purposes is QE, total domestic demand is QD + QE, and exports are QX = QS – (QD+ 
QE).  
 
3.  The model 
Elaborating on Salhofer (1997) the Austrian agribusiness of bread grain is modeled by a log-
linear, three-stage, vertically-structured model.  The first stage includes four markets of input   5
factors used for bread grain production:  land, labor, durable investment goods (e.g. 
machinery and buildings), and operating inputs (e.g. fertilizer, seeds).  Since 95% of farmland 
is owned by farmers and 86% of labor in the agricultural sector is self-employed, land (A) and 
labor (B) are assumed to be factors offered solely by farmers in perfectly competitive markets.  
On the contrary, investment goods (G), and operating inputs (H) are supplied by upstream 
industries, which are assumed to have some market power to set the prices above marginal 
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=- ,   (i = G, H), 
where Qi denotes the quantity supplied, Xi is the shift parameter, Pi the price, ei the supply 
elasticity of input factor i, and Li is the Lerner index (defined as the ratio between the profit 
margin and the price) of input factor industry i.   
Export and import of input factors are not considered.  Hence, it is assumed that 
domestic consumption of input factors equals domestic production.  This is certainly correct 
for land and agricultural labor and is also appropriate for important industrially produced 
input factors (e.g. tractors, fertilizer) before joining the EU.   
At the second stage, input factors of the first stage are used to produce bread grain 
assuming a CES production technology: 
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where QS denotes the produced quantity of bread grain, XQS the production function efficiency 
parameter, ai the distribution parameter of factor i, r the substitution parameter, and sS the 
elasticity of substitution between input factors at the farm level.   
The first and the second stage are linked by the assumption that bread grain producers 
maximize their profits.  Assuming a perfectly competitive bread grain market factor prices 
equal the value of marginal product: 
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where PE is the gross price and CLPE is the co-responsibility levy for bread grain that exceed 
the quota QQ (see Figure 1), and TF is the fertilizer tax per unit.   
The produced quantity of bread grain is used for food production (QD), animal feed 
(QE), and exports (QX):   
(4)   QS = QD + QE + QX.   
The third stage aggregates firms which process and distribute bread grain, such as 
wholesale buyers, mills, exporters, and foodstuffs’ producers.  Bread grain (D) along with 
other input factors of labor (J), and capital (K) (a residual of including all other inputs except 
D and J) are combined to produce food (bread grain products like flour, bread, noodles).  
Supplies of J and K are again modeled by constant elasticity functions: 
(5)   
i
iii QXP
e = ,   (i = J, K,),  
and food production by a CES technology:     7
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where QSF represents the produced quantity of food (bread grain products), XQSF the 
production function shift parameter, ai the distribution parameter of factor i, g the substitution 
parameter, and sF the elasticity of substitution between input factors at the food industry 
level.   
Assuming some market power in the food sector input demand is represented by  














,   (i = J, K, D), 
where PF denotes the price of food, PD the gross price of bread grain under the quota, and LF 
the Lerner index of the downstream sector.   
Food demand is modeled by a constant elasticity function: 
(8)   
F
DFQDFF QXP
h = , 
where QDF represents the demanded quantity of food, XQDF a shift parameter, and hF the 
elasticity of demand.   
Import and export of processed bread grain do not play an important role in Austria.  
According to Astl (1991), the ratio of imports to total consumption of bread and baker’s ware 
is less than 7%.  According to Raab (1994), exports of flour and flour products increased but 
were still only 20,000 t or 4% of domestically processed bread grain in 1993.  Given these 
facts, we assume that domestic demand of bread grain products equals domestic supply:   
(9)   QDF = QSF.   8
Bread grain demand for feeding purposes are also modeled by a constant elasticity 
demand function:   
(10)   
E
EQDEE QXP
h = , 
where XQDE and hE are the shift parameter and the elasticity of animal feedstuffs demand, 
respectively.  







l = . 
The model in Equations (1) through (11) is calibrated, in order to match the three year 
averages of prices and quantities over the period 1991 - 1993.  
Based on Equations (1) through (11) welfare levels for different social groups and 
policy scenarios can be calculated:  Welfare of bread grain farmers (UBF) is measured as the 
sum of Marshallian producer surpluses from supplying land and labor: 















Welfare of upstream industries (UUI) is measured as the sum of producer surpluses from 
supplying investment goods and operating inputs (first term in Equation (13)) and oligopoly 
rents in these industries (second term),  
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Similar, welfare of downstream industry (UDI) is measured as producer surpluses from 
supplying capital and labor to food industry (first term) and food industries oligopoly rent 
(second term): 


















Welfare of food consumers (UCS) is calculated as Marshallian consumer surplus: 














.   
Similar, welfare of buyers of bread grain for animal feed (UBS) is calculated as 















This buyers surplus includes the welfare of consumers of the final product (e.g. meat) as well 
as the welfare of all suppliers of factors necessary to produce this final good (Just, Huth and 
Schmitz, 1982).  
Taxpayers' welfare (UTX) is measured by budget revenues minus expenditures times 
marginal cost of public funds (MCF):
1 










------- ￿￿ Øø ￿￿ D=+ ￿￿ Œœ --++-+ ￿￿ ºß ￿￿
, 
where CLPD refers to the co-responsibility levy of bread grain under the quota, AEC refers to 
export cost in addition to the difference between the domestic price and the world market 
price, like transportation cost and the wholesalers' markup, and ST refers to the premium 
wholesale buyers get for storing bread grain under the quota.  The first term in Equation (17)   10
describes expenditures for exports and revenues from the co-responsibility levy, and the 
second term describes revenues from fertilizer taxation.  
 
4.  Model parameters 
To run the model including Equations (1) through (11) and to calculate the welfare of social 
groups including Equations (12) through (17), 32 parameter values are necessary (eA, eB, eG, 
eH, eJ, eK, aA, aB, aG, aH, aJ, aK, aD, sS, sF, hE, hF, LG, LH, LF, XA, XB, XG, XH, XJ, XK, XQS, 
XQSF, XQDF, XQE, l, MCF).  While 13 values (XA, XB, XG, XH, XJ, XK, XQS, XQSF, XQDF, XQE, aD, 
aH, aK) of these 32 parameters are endogenously derived in the calibration process, 19  
specific parameter values (eA, eB, eG, eH, eJ, eK, aA, aB, aG, aJ, sS, sF, hE, hF, LG, LH, LF, l, 
MCF) have to be assumed.   
Instead of one (ore a few) specific value(s) for each parameter, here we assume more 
conservatively each parameter to be in a plausible range.  The upper and lower bound of this 
range are identified based on own estimations, results from recent empirical studies for 
Austria, and an extensive literature review on parameter values for European countries.   
Afterwards, two times 10,000 parameter sets are created by assuming two alternative 
distributions between the upper and lower boundary of each parameter:  i) a normal 
distribution N(m, s,) with m = (a+b)/2 and s = (m-a)/1.96, where a and b are the upper and 
lower parameter values and the normal distribution is truncated at a and b, the boundaries of 
the 95% confidence interval.  ii) a uniform distribution U(a, b).   
These two parameter distributions characterize two alternative assumptions:  While the 
normal distribution assumes that values in the middle of the parameter interval are more 
likely, the uniform distribution assumes that each value within the upper and lower boundary 
is equally likely.  In both cases the parameter values are assumed to be symmetrically 
distributed.    11
 
4.1.  Land supply elasticity 
Elasticities of a change in land area given a change in land prices, as needed for the model, 
are not directly available from the literature.  However, following Abler (2000) one can derive 
such elasticities indirectly from elasticities of land supply with respect to product prices by 
assuming that changes in product prices and hence returns are to some degree capitalized in 
land prices.  Based on an extensive literature review Abler (2000) suggest a plausible range to 
be between 0.2 and 0.6 for the US.  In a similar attempt Salhofer (2000) suggest a plausible 
range to be between 0.1 and 0.4 for Europe.  Hence, here we follow Salhofer (2000).   
 
4.2.  Labor supply elasticities 
According to Salhofer (2000) most studies on farm labor supply in Europe report rather low 
estimates at the household level between 0.2 and 0.3.  However, labor supply elasticities 
derived from household models cover only the effect of a change in the wage rate on the 
hours worked and not the effect of labor force moving into (out of) the sector.  Hence, the 
aggregated (sector wide) labor supply elasticity can be expected to be higher than the 
individual supply elasticities based on household models.  For example, Kimmel and 
Kniesner (1998) found for a large random sample of US (not farm) households that a 1% 
increase in wage rates will reduce the hours worked by each employee by 0.5%, but will also 
reduce the number of employees by 1.5%.  While the first number is comparable to the 
elasticities estimated in most cross section studies, the second number refers to the sectoral 
effect of a wage change.   
More aggregated farm labor supply elasticities can be derived from studies using time 
series data on farm labor supply and wage rates.  However, as reviewed in Salhofer (1999) 
most of these studies on aggregated farm labor supply in developed countries date back to the   12
sixties and seventies using simple estimation procedures (e.g. Tyrchniewicz and Schuh, 1969; 
Bhati, 1978; Gallasch and Gardner, 1978).  Estimated elasticities are in a wide range between 
0.03 and 2.84 with a tendency of being larger in the long run and for hired labor, while 
Cowling, Metcalf and Rayner (1970) only report such an aggregated elasticity of 0.5 for an 
European country, the UK.  
In addition, as explicitly shown in Barkley (1990) the labor supply elasticity is sensitive 
to the length of run.  In the long run, everyone in agriculture is a potential migrant and the 
elasticity of labor supply is the same as the elasticity of migration.  
Therefore, given the high percentage of family labor in Austria and the medium run 
orientation of our analysis the supply elasticity of farm labor is assumed to be between 0.2 
and 1.   
The same arguments can be made for the case of labor supply at the food industry level.  
Numerous microeconomic household studies of labor supply report low or even negative 
own-wage elasticities for nonfarm sectors.  For example Hansson and Stuart (1985) surveyed 
28 studies on labor supply and calculated a median uncompensated wage elasticity of labor 
supply of 0.10 and a compensated wage elasticity of 0.25.  In a comparable effort Fullerton 
(1982) derived an uncompensated wage elasticity of 0.15.  However, using aggregated data of 
22 OECD countries and simulation techniques Hansson and Stuart (1993) derive aggregated 
uncompensated wage elasticities of labor supply between 0.2 and 1.4 as well as of 0.8 for 
Austria.  Hence, we assume the labor supply elasticity at the food industry level to be between 
0.2 and 1.4.   
 
4.3.  Operating inputs and investment goods supply elasticities 
Estimates of supply elasticities of operating inputs as well as investment goods at the farm 
level are virtually absent from the literature.  The only exceptions for Europe are to our   13
knowledge Dryburgh and Doyle (1995) who estimate the supply elasticity of farm machinery 
to be 1.9 for the UK and Salhofer (1997) who estimates the supply of fertilizer to be 1.2 for 
Austria.  Some studies assume elasticity values rather than estimating them.  While some of 
these studies argue that in the long run these supply elasticities can be assumed to be infinite 
(e.g. Hertel, 1989;  Abler and Shortle 1992;  Shortle and Laughland, 1994), short and medium 
run oriented studies assume supply elasticities typically between 1 and 5 (e.g. Trail 1979;  
Gardner, 1987;  Sawar and Fox, 1992).  Based on the medium run orientation of this analysis 
we follow the later and assume that the elasticity of supply of operating inputs as well as of 
investment goods are in a wide and elastic (but not perfectly elastic) range between 1 and 5.   
The same arguments can be made for the supply elasticity of investment goods at the 
food industry.  Because of the absence of empirical values we assume a broad elastic range 
between 1 and 5.   
 
4.4.  Elasticity of substitution at the farm level 
Since the elasticity of substitution is assumed to be an important parameter of the model, a 
CES production function including four inputs (land, labor, durable investments, and 
operating inputs) is estimated for the bread grain sector in Austria and reported in the 
Appendix.  The elasticity of substitution derived from estimations is 0.46 with a standard 
deviation of 0.01.   
Based on an extensive literature review, Salhofer (2000) estimated average elasticities 
of substitution for Europe between all possible pairs of land, labor, capital and operating 
inputs.  In particular he derived an average elasticity of substitution between land an labor of 
0.5, between land and capital of 0.2. between land and operating inputs of 1.4, between labor 
and capital of 0.5, between labor and operating inputs of 1, and between capital and operating 
inputs of 0.4 (Salhofer, 2000, Table 3).  Based on these results and using cost shares (as   14
discussed below) as weights we derive an average elasticity of substitution between all four 
inputs of 0. 65 with a standard deviation of 1.09.  Given this, we assume the elasticity of 
substitution at the farm level is between 0.1 and 0.9. 
 
4.5.  Elasticity of substitution at the food industry level 
Econometric estimations of a CES production function at the food industry level are reported 
in the Appendix.  Results of a three input (labor, capital, agricultural input) CES production 
function are not very convincing.  Better results are derive for a CES production function with 
labor and capital per unit of agricultural input.  For this case the elasticity of substitution is 
estimated to be 0.57 with a standard deviation of 0.07.  
Humphrey and Moroney (1975) estimated elasticities of substitution between capital, 
labor and natural resource products for the U.S manufacturing sector.  For the food sector 
they derived that the estimates of the elasticities of substitution between each pair of these 
three inputs are not significantly different from each other and range between 1.34 and 1.51.  
The elasticities of substitution not being very different from each other for every pair of these 
three factors is also confirmed by a study for Germany.  Rutner (1984) found for 15 different 
econometric models that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is ranging 
from 0.7 to 1 (and on average 0.9), between capital and the natural resource product from 1.0 
to 1.2 (average 1), and between labor and the natural resource product from 0.5 to 1.1 (0.9) 
sector.  Hence, we assume the elasticity of substitution in the food sector is between 0.5 and 
1.5. 
   15
4.6.  Distribution Parameters at the farm and food industry level 
Distribution parameters of the underlying CES production technology can be calculated from 
cost (factor) shares.  For the simple case of a CES function with two inputs one can derive 
from the first order conditions of the profit maximization problem that  
 













, and a2 = 1 – a1 
where a1, X1and W1 are the distribution parameter, the quantity, and the price of factor 1 and s 
is the elasticity of substitution.  Since in our model the quantities of all inputs are standardized 
to 100 the distribution parameter of factor one is equal to its cost share.  The same result is 
derived for more than two inputs.   
To derive cost shares of inputs for bread grain production in Austria farm accounting 
data (LBG, 1993, 1994) and gross margin calculations (BMLF, 1991, 1992, 1993) are 
utilized.  The cost shares derived for land, labor, investment goods and operating inputs are 
0.08, 0.34, 0.15, and 0.43, respectively.  Using SPEL (production and income model for the 
agricultural sector of the European Community) data (Kniepert, 1998) a cost share for 
operating inputs of 0.46 is calculated.  In addition, 16 studies for Western European countries 
are reviewed (Table 1).  The average cost shares (and their standard deviations) derived from 
these studies are 0.10 (0.04) for land, 0.34 (0.10) for labor, 0.14 (0.08) for investment goods, 
and 0.41 (0.13) for operating inputs.  Given this, we assume the cost share of land, labor, and 
investment goods to be in ranges of 0.06 to 0.10, of 0.29 to 0.39, and of 0.11 to 0.19, 
respectively. Given the assumption of constant returns to scale the cost share of operating 
inputs is calculated as a residual and hence is between 0.32 and 0.54.   16
Cost shares at the food industry level are calculated in the following way:  Utilizing 
food industry and business statistics (Mazanek, 1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c, 1996) 
one derives the cost share of labor in the food manufacturing sector to be 0.16.  Based on 
ÖSTAT (1997, 1998) the cost share of labor for wholesale and retail trade with grain products 
are calculated to be 0.66 and 0.73, respectively.  Weighting these numbers by the production 
value of each stage (see Aiginger et al. 1990, p. 84) we derive the cost share of labor for the 
whole downstream industry to be in the range of 0.27 to 0.37.  The cost share of bread grain 
as an input at the food industry level is implicitly given in the model and varies between 0.07 
and 0.11.  Given the assumption of constant returns to scale the cost share of capital is 
calculated as a residual and hence is between 0.52 and 0.66.   
 
4.7.  Agricultural share of expenditures for bread grain products 
Based on the Agricultural Balances for Austria one can derive an average agricultural share of 
expenditures for bread grain products of 9.1% for the period 1991 to 1993.  Schneider (1986) 
calculated agricultural shares of cereal product expenditures for the years 1973 to 1984.  
Using this time series and applying dynamic forecasting tools as implemented in EVIEWS 3.1 
for different models (linear and log-linear, with and without constant term, with and without 
ARMA processes) the best guess of the agricultural share of expenditures for cereal products 
between 1991 and 1993 is 6.8%.  Utilizing these two calculations and weighting the first more 
since it is based on actual data (rather than forecasts) and for bread grain (rather than cereals) 
we assume the agricultural share of expenditures for bread grain products is between 0.7 and 
0.10. 
   17
4.8.  Lerner Index of upstream and downstream industries 
Not much information is available if upstream and downstream industries are able to exert 
some market power to set the prices above marginal cost.  The Austrian food manufacturing 
sector is to a great extend small structured.  In 1993, about 93,000 employees worked in about 
7,000 enterprises of the food and luxury food industry and business what implies an average 
of about 14 employees (Mazanek, 1995a, 1996).  However, about 70% of these enterprises 
had less than 20 employees and accounted only for 8% of the output.   
Trail and Gilpin (1998) calculate for the food and drink manufacturing industry in the 
EU that 0.3% of the enterprises classified as large (>500 employees) account for 40% of the 
output, what might point to some market concentration.  However, a quite different picture is 
conceived for the grain milling sector in particular with small (<10) and medium firms 
accounting for 72% and 25% of output, respectively.  Similar numbers are given for the 
industrial baking sector with 56% of output produced by small firms and 29% by medium 
firms.   
In an extensive review and evaluation of recent research on market concentration in 
food processing Sexton and Lavoie (1998, p. 45) conclude that though many studies tend to 
find some evidence of market power, the measured departures from competition have mostly 
been small.  
While the concentration ratio in food manufacturing is unclear there is some evidence of 
market concentration in food retailing.  Aiginger, Wieser and Wüger (1999) report a four-firm 
concentration ratio (CR-4) of the food retailing sector in Austria of 58% in 1993.   
Given this we assume the Lerner index to be in a wide but moderate range between 0 
and 0.2 implying that the product price is set between 0 and 25% above marginal cost.  
There has been little detailed study of industries that supply manufactured inputs to 
agriculture.  Notable exceptions for Europe are McCorrsiton and Sheldon (1986, 1989) and   18
McCorriston (1993).  According to McCorriston (1993) the actual observed behavior of input 
industries (fertilizer, tractor) in the UK was significantly more competitive than the Cournot 
outcome.  Hence we again assume the Lerner index to be in a wide but moderate range 
between 0 and 0.2 as for the upstream industries.  
 
4.9.  Food demand elasticity 
For Austria Wüger (1988) estimated demand elasticities for food and beverages utilizing 
single equations as well as complete demand systems.  He reports demand elasticities for 
cereal products between –0.1 and –0.6.  Schneider and Wüger (1989) report as best estimates 
of several econometric models a demand elasticity for wheat flour of –0.3 and of rye floor of 
–0.2.  Based on these estimates and in accordance with multiple recent studies for other 
European countries which all estimate values within this range (Karagiannis and Velentzas, 
1997; Fulponi, 1989; Molina, 1994;  Rickertsen, 1998; Michalek and Keyzer, 1992) we 
assume that the demand elasticity of bread grain products is in the range of –0.1 to –0.6. 
 
4.10.  Feed demand elasticity 
For Austria Neunteufel (1997) estimates an own-price elasticity of wheat within a group of 
different cereals of –0.93 and an own-price elasticity of rye of –1.43.  
Peeters and Surry (1997) reviewed the arts of estimating price-responsiveness of feed 
demand in the European Union and distinguished three commonly used approaches: i) linear 
programming; ii) econometrics, and iii) synthetic modeling.  They discussed that due to these 
different approaches derived elasticity values vary over a wide range.  Moreover, they give 
some arguments for the superiority of the econometric approach.  Given this, we reviewed 
nine studies using a modern econometric dual approach (neglecting older linear single-
equation models) (Table 2).  The mean value of all elasticities for cereals and wheat given in   19
this ten studies is -0.88, with a standard deviation of 0.48.  Hence we assume the elasticity of 
feed demand to be in the range of 0.5 to 1.5.  
 
4.11.  Marginal cost of public funds 
The actual magnitude of the MCF depends on the initial tax structure, the specific tax that is 
changed, and the responsiveness of economic agents.  According to Hagemann, Jones and 
Montador (1988) many published studies on this subject report estimates in the range 1.07 – 
1.47.  Here we assume the MCF to be in a range from 1.1 to 1.4. 
 
5.  Empirical analysis 
As discussed above, the main objective of agricultural policy in Austria, as in most developed 
countries, in general was to support farm income.  Beside income redistribution, securing a 
sufficient supply and quality of bread grain products and animal feedstuffs was the most 
important goal of Austria's bread grain policy in particular (Mannert, 1991).  Given this, we 
may simplify government’s decision problem as trying to maximize social welfare given a 
socially demanded level of farmer’s welfare and self-sufficiency.
2  Assuming that the socially 
demanded transfer level is reflected in the actually observed transfer level, that self-
sufficiency is given when domestic supply is greater or equal domestic demand, and that the 
policy instruments available to government are the actually used instruments, government’s 
decision problem can be formalized as: 
 





















BF U  is the actually observed welfare level of farmers, and Qx are bread grain exports.     20
The official goal of introducing a tax on fertilizer was soil protection and hence 
environmentally motivated.  For simplicity it is assumed that this environmental goal is 
separable from other goals and optimally met by the current level of fertilizer tax.  Hence, 
government can freely choose the levels of five policy instruments (PE, CLPE, PQD, CLPQD, 
QQ) to maximize welfare under given constraints.   
Utilizing the described simulation model, assumed distributions of parameter values, 
and welfare measures optimization problem (19) is solved numerically for 2 times 10,000 
alternative parameter sets utilizing GAMS software (Brooke et al. 1988).  As a result two 
alternative distributions of the optimal welfare levels as well as the optimal policy instrument 
levels are derived.  
Utilizing the same model, parameter sets, and welfare measures, but taking the world 
market price of bread grain one can simulate a hypothetical nonintervention scenarios.  Thus, 
the social cost of the optimal policy are measured as SC
*=W
* - W
W where W* and W
W are the 
welfare level in the optimal situation and in the world market price situation, respectively.  
Similarly, assuming plugging in the actually observed prices into the simulation model one 




A is the 
actual welfare level.  Finally, the relative social cost (RSC) give the share by which the social 
cost could have been reduced, if the government would have used an optimal combination of 
policy instruments RSC = (SC
A - SC
*)/SC
A.  This gives a measure of how close the actual 
policy is to the optimal policy.   
This is illustrated in Figure 1 with the welfare of farmers  BF U  and non-farmers, as an 
aggregate of all other groups () UIDICSBSTA UUUUU ++++ , on the axes.  Point E describes 
the welfare distribution between these two groups without government intervention.  If lump-
sum transfers as well as lump-sum taxes would be possible, government could redistribute 
welfare from non-farmers to farmers along a 45° line through point E.  However, here with   21
the assumption of no lump-sum policy instruments the best government can do is described 
by a concave utility possibility curve.  If 
A
BF U  is the socially demanded welfare level of 
farmers and point A is the actually observed welfare distribution, distance AB are the social 
cost of the actual policy (Bullock and Salhofer, 1998).  The policy derived by the 




A = AO/BO. 
The empirical results for the assumption of normally distributed parameters are 
summarized in Table 3.  At the mean the social cost of the actually policy are measured to be 
€ 159 million (about 42% of the value of bread grain production) with a standard deviation of 
€ 23 million.  In 95% (9,500 cases) of our 10,000 simulations the social cost are in a range of 
€ 116 million to € 206 million.  The 75% probability interval is between € 131 million € 188 
million.  In the case of the optimal policy the social cost are significantly smaller with a mean 
of € 91 million, a standard deviation of € 24 million, a 95% probability interval between € 45 
million and € 139 million, and a 75% interval between € 62 million and € 121 million.  
Therefore, by using the same instruments at different levels government could have reduced 
the social cost on average by € 68 million, about 44% of the actual social cost, and with a 
95% (75%) probability between 32%  (35%) and 63% (53%). 
Assuming a uniform distribution of the parameter values between the upper and lower 
boundary does not change the mean and median significantly (Table 4), but certainly causes 
higher standard deviations and hence wider probability intervals. 
 
6.  Sensitivity Analysis 
To analyze the sensitivity of the RSC with respect to the model parameters, surface response 
functions are utilized (Zhao, Griffiths, Griffith, Mullen, 2000).  The nonlinear relationships 
between RSC and model parameters are described by its second order approximation, i.e. a   22
quadratic polynomial, comprising a constant, the 19 parameters pari, (aA, aB, aG, aJ, l, eA, eB, 
eG, eH, eK, eJ, hF, hE, sS, sF, LF, LG, LH, MCF) and the permutations pari parj of the products 










=+++ ￿￿￿ ,  
with c0, ci, and dij being regression coefficients, and e an error term.   
Equation (20) is estimated using the 10,000 parameter sets drawn from the uniform 
distributions and the implied RSC-values.  However, to exclude extreme parameter 
combinations the lowest and highest 2.5% of RSC-values are omitted, leaving 9,500 
observations. 
OLS-estimation of the response function exhibits an extremely good fit (R
2 = 0.993) as 
well as medium to high levels of significance for a majority of coefficients.  About 57% of the 
coefficients are significant at the 99%, level, 3% at the 95% level, and 12% at the 90% level 
(Table 5 and Table 6).  
The elasticity of the Relative Social Costs with respect to the 19 parameters was 
calculated performing the following Monte Carlo experiment:  First, the 9,500 parameter sets 
and the estimated response function were used to calculate 9,500 RSC “base”-values.  
Second, the parameter sets were slightly changed by increasing all 9,500 values of the first 
parameter, e.g. a A, by 1% and calculating 9,500 RSC “new”-values.  Third, subtracting the 
9,500 new RSC values from the 9,500 base-values and dividing the difference by the base 
value leads to 9,500 elasticity values, i.e. the percentage change of the RSC with respect to a 
1% change in the first parameter.  The left block of Table 7 reveals that at the mean (median) 
of all 9,500 calculated elasticity values a 1% change in the parameter a A decreases the RSC 
by 0.007% (0.005%) with a standard deviation of 1.8%, a maximum value of 0.055% and a 
minimum value of –0.092%.  The same procedures lead to elasticities for all other parameters.    23
The fact that the minimum elasticities are negative and the maximum elasticities are positive 
for all parameters reveals how the effect of a change in one parameter depends on the levels 
of all other parameters.  Only four elasticities are significant different from zero at the 90% 
level or higher:  the agricultural share of expenditures for bread grain products (l), the Lerner 
index of the downstream industry (LF), the elasticity of substitution at the food industry level 
(sF), and the marginal cost of public funds (MCF).   
Alternatively to the mean value in the left block of Table 7, the first column represents 
the percentage change in RSC, when one parameter is changed by 1% and all other 
parameters are kept unchanged at their mean values.  The results in the first columns of the 
left and the right block do not differ significantly from each other.  The second and third 
columns of the right block, RSCmin and RSCmax, do not denote percentage changes, but the 
values of Relative Social Cost, when one parameter is set respectively at the lower and upper 
bound of its associated range, and all other parameters are set at their mean values.  The last 
column, D(RSC), simply indicates the difference in the absolute Relative Social Costs 
(D(RSC) = RSCmax - RSCmin).  This can be interpreted as the „imprecision“ in RSC due to the 
fact that in the model, the parameters used are range estimates rather than point estimates.  
The higher the absolute value of this last column, the greater the gain in the precision of the 
estimated RSC associated with a narrower parameter range.  The parameters l, sF and LF 
exhibit the widest ranges.  Hence, additional information on their actual values would be most 
beneficiary to the simulation model. 
 
7.  Discussion 
As a rule, governments defend their policy as efficient in common political statements.  
Utilizing a three-stage vertically structured model including upstream and downstream 
industries it was shown over a wide range of possible model parameter values that the   24
Austrian bread grain policy was quite inefficient in meeting its two main objectives, namely 
supporting farm income and self-sufficiency.  In fact, the social cost could on average have 
been reduced by more than 40% by using the same policy instruments, but at efficient levels.   
Observing that government was very inefficient in achieving the main explicitly stated 
objectives desires some rationalization.  Five rationales are given below:  1) Uncertainty 
about demand and supply:  Demand, but especially supply of agricultural products are 
influenced by changes in exogenous factors government can not influence and/or not 
anticipate.  Best known examples are weather, technological progress (a good example might 
be the rapid adoption of genetically modified seeds in the US in the last years) and changes in 
consumer preferences (e.g. a drastically change in demand for meat due to the BSE crises).  
However, in the case of the Austrian bread grain market before EU accession no such extreme 
exogenous shift in demand or supply appeared and changing weather conditions are 
controlled to some extent by taking three year averages.  
2.) Uncertainty about policy effects:  Government can not perfectly anticipate how a 
change in policy will influences the behavior of individuals and firms.  With for example an 
increase in floor price consumers might substitute bread grain products for meat of soybean 
products and farmers might increase investments in land or agricultural machinery.  The exact 
magnitudes of these changes are not known and sometimes difficult to anticipate.
3  Given this 
it is not surprising to observe that the actual observed policy will never exactly match with the 
ex-post algebraically optimal policy.  However, the large estimated difference in social cost 
between the actual and the optimal policy outcome raises the question if this rational is the 
only (main) sources of observed inefficiencies.  It was quite obvious that a (the) main source 
of inefficiency was the high level of surplus production and the implied expensive export 
subsidies.  The self-sufficiency rate (domestic supply divided by domestic demand) during the 
period the examined bread grain policy was in place (1989 – 1994) was on average 136%   25
with a standard deviation of 8%, and therefore, much higher than actually needed to guarantee 
self sufficiency.   
3) Policy inertia:  The static analysis carried out in this study neglects that government 
can not only choose the type and levels of policy instruments, but also the point in time at 
which a policy is changed.  Therefore, at each point in time government has to decide if the 
cost of changing a policy are higher or lower as the cost of having a suboptimal policy in 
place.  Only if the latter is true government will change its policy.  The cost of changing a 
policy can be grouped into compliance and transaction cost.  Compliance cost evolve from the 
fact that economic agents (have to) align to a change in policy.  An example are investments 
in machinery and buildings during a high floor price regime that are no longer used to full 
capacity after a drastically price drop.  Transaction cost include cost of necessary changes in 
the administration and enforcement of the policy as well as political cost policy acceptance. 
4.) Path dependency:  Since smaller reforms are usually easier realized than large 
ones, today’s policy (type as well as level of instruments) clearly depends to some extent on 
yesterday’s policy (Koester, 1997).  The floor price policy observed in many agricultural 
markets in developed countries were born and breed from food shortage after World War II.  
High producer prices stimulated investments and production and a supply shift.  The same is 
true for the case of bread grain in Austria.  From the end of the 70’s supply exceeded demand 
and production surplus and expenses for export subsidies increased.  However, at that time 
producers were used to and consumers no longer aware of the high prices of agricultural 
products and government tried to tame the increasing surplus production by minor 
adjustments like the introduction of the co-responsibility levy in 1979 or the change to a two-
price plan ( a higher floor price for a certain amount of bread grain under a quota and a lower 
floor price for the rest) rather than a radical change in the support system.     26
5.) Implicit policy objectives:  From a political economy point of view government 
does not act like a benevolent dictator, but rather tries to maximize its probability to stay in 
power.  Hence, instead of (or in addition to) following the explicit (official) objectives, it also 
has implicit (not officially mentioned) policy objectives.  For example, Salhofer, Hofreither 
and Sinabell (2000) discuss that beside farmers upstream and downstream industries had 
considerable formal (institutionalized) and informal influence the agricultural policy decision-
making process in Austria.  Moreover, they confirm that upstream and downstream industries 
clearly benefited from the existing policy.  Therefore, from a political economy point of view 
one could argue that though support of upstream and downstream industries never was an 
explicit official goal of farm policy, following political pressure from this group it was an 
implicit (not officially mentioned) policy objective.   
The results derived in this study are based on computer intensive simulation and 
sensitivity-analysis techniques.  Therefore, ranges of parameter values, rather than a few 
specific values are assumed.  This has several advantages:  First, instead of producing one (or 
a few) specific but highly uncertain number(s) about the effect of a policy, we are able to give 
a plausible range as well as a mean.  Second, the results of the sensitivity analysis clearly 
reveal how a change in one parameter influences the results as well as what parameters are 
especially sensitive to the results.  Hence, this gives a hint in which direction additional 
research effort (time) is invested efficiently.    27
                                                 
Footnotes: 
1   In multiplying budget expenditures times marginal cost of public funds it is taken into 
account that raising money to  support the agricultural sector causes distortions in other 
sectors.  Given the small share of the cost of agricultural programmes in the total budget 
the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) might be a good measure of these additional cost. 
2   Note, that equally one could describe government’s decision problem as minimizing social 
cost, given a certain amount of wealth transfers to farmers and self-sufficiency. 
3   An alternative way to think about this problem is in terms of information cost.  The degree 
to which government can anticipate the effects o f a policy change depends on how much 
information it has about individuals and firms.  Clearly there is a trade off between the cost 
of collecting this information (e.g. by doing surveys) and the cost of implementing a 
suboptimal policy.   28
Appendix:  Estimation of bread grain and food industry production functions 
The model 
Production is assumed to follow a Constant Elasticity of Supply (CES) technology.
1  
Allowing for technical progress, a four-input CES production function can be defined as 
(A1)    [ ] z z z z z x b x b x b x b b rt q
1
4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 ) exp( + + + + =  
where t is a variable which increases linearly over time, and r, z, b0, b1, b2, b3, and b4 are 
coefficients to be estimated. 
In this definition, the CES is non-linear in the coefficients and can either be estimated 
utilizing nonlinear estimation procedures as for example implemented in the econometric 
package EVIEWS or by using first order conditions of profit maximization (Arrow et al. 
1961).  Nonlinear estimation procedures showed convergence problems and dependency of 
the results from the starting values.  Using first order conditions requires data on input prices 
which ware not available in this case.  Hence, rewriting (A1) as 
(A2)    [ ]
z z z z
z
x b x b x b x b b
rt
q
4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 ) exp(
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i i x x = ~  yields 
(A3)    4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ x b x b x b x b b q + + + + = .   29
If we can assume the error term to be additive to the inputs (the error term acts like an 
additional input factor), 
(A4)  u x b x b x b x b b q + + + + + = 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , 
which can be estimated using OLS.
2 
The problem with (A4) is that in order to perform this transformation we need the 
values of z and r, which we do not know.  We can, however, estimate them using a kind of 
„two stage“ Maximum Likelihood approach.   
If we can assume the errors to be additive and normally distributed, the probability of 
observation i, given parameters z and r, is 
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with resi the ith residual from and s the standard error of the OLS-estimation of (A.4) and  
(A6)   
























the transformation of the probability density function due to the transformation of  i q  to  i q ~ .
3 
                                                                                                                                                        
1   The more general translog function is not chosen since a four-input translog function, even 
without allowing for technical progress, requires the estimation of 14 coefficients.  Our set 
of annual data covers the years 1962-1994 –33 data points. 
2   A similar approach can be found in Boyes and Kavanough (1978).   30
If the errors are independent, the joint probability (the likelihood) of all observations is 
simply the product of all the observations’ probabilities (or, after taking logs, the sum of all 
log-probabilities) 





i z r q P z r logL
1
) , | ( log ) , | (q  
Maximization of the Likelihood function can then be performed by numerical methods. 
Furthermore, utilizing the Cramer-Rao theorem (see, e.g. Johnston, 1984), we can assign 
confidence intervals to our coefficients.
4  
For the present purpose, we need to estimate two production functions:  production of 
bread grain, and production of food. 
 
Production of Bread Grains 
Primary production of bread grain QS is modeled with four inputs: land B, labor L, capital K, 
and fertilizer N.
5  Moreover, to allow for technical progress we include an exponential term. 
Thus, the CES can be written as
6 
                                                                                                                                                        
3   If we transform a variable u with a probability density function of p(u), the transformed 
variable y = f(u) has a probability density function of 
dy
du
u p y p ) ( ) ( =  (Johnston, 1984, 
535f). 
4   For a more complete treatment concerning the estimation of and inference in the Maximum 
Likelihood function, see Streicher (2000).  
5   The time series for B, L, K, and N span the years 1962 – 1994 and are scaled in a way that 
˘(1991-93) = 100 (Salhofer, 1997).   31
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After performing the transformations described above, we obtain 











%  and 
z
ii xx = %  for xi = B, L, K, N.  
Estimation results are represented in Table A1.  With one exception, the estimated 
values are significant, the exception being the value of the fertilizer parameter, which exhibits 
the wrong sign (implying that an increase in fertilizer would actually decrease output, if not 
by much).  The result might be explained by the fact that our fertilizer series consists of traded 
nitrogen fertilizer only and does not include manure.  Since data on the usage of manure are 
not available it was tried to estimate manure quantities from head numbers of cattle, hog and 
chicken.  The inclusion of this estimate of organic fertilizer did not improve the econometric 
results.  This is not really surprising since the numbers found in the agricultural literature to 
estimate annual quantities of manure were extremely rough rules of thumb along the line of 
20-80 kg of pure nitrogen per year per dairy cow.  The elasticity of substitution implied by z = 
-1.186 is 0.46 and the growth rate is 2.74% per year.  
The estimated coefficients imply marginal productivities, the rise in output after a 1% 
rise in the respective input.  AS depicted in Figure A1 total productivity, i.e. the rise in output 
if all inputs are increased by 1%, is 1% as we have estimated the CES without a constant and 
therefore subject to constant returns to scale.  Marginal productivity of land remained fairly 
                                                                                                                                                        
6   We also tried including a constant term to allow for variable returns to scale.  The constant 
turned out to be highly insignificant, allowing us to reformulate the function with constant 
returns to scale.   32
constant over time.  Labor exhibits rising and capital falling marginal productivity, reflecting 
the trend towards increased mechanization. 
 
Table A1:  Estimation results of bread grain production function  
Coeff.  Est. value  Std. error 
z  -1.18600  0.04739 
r  0.02740  0.00347 
b1  1.23959  0.19115 
b2  1.62642  0.45838 
b3  0.10496  0.03964 
b4  -0.14980  0.14370 
R
2  0.90   
DW  1.80   
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Production of Food 
Production of food QSF is modeled with three inputs: labor L, capital K, and agricultural 
inputs (including bread grain) QD.  Again, to allow for technical progress we include an 
exponential term.  Thus, the CES can be written as   
(A10)    [ ] z z
D
z z
SF Q b K b L b b rt Q
1
3 2 1 0 ) exp( + + + =  
Direct estimation of (A3) resulted in convergence problems; therefore, a CES was 
formulated for the production of food per unit of agricultural inputs: 











































As depicted in TableA2 all coefficients are significant and have the expected sign.  The 
elasticity of substitution implied by z = 0.0253 is 1.103. 
 
Table A2:  Estimation results of food production function  
Coeff.  Est. value  Std. error 
z  -0.76600  0.18615 
r  0.02530  0.00048 
b0  0.18835  0.06878 
b1  1.52529  0.27921 
b2  0.18987  0.05822 
R
2  0.99   
DW  1.42   
   34
The marginal productivities implied by estimated coefficients are illustrated in Figure 
A2.  Capital exhibits falling and labor rising marginal productivities, again reflecting 
increasing mechanization of the production process.  Total productivity is no longer constant , 
but slightly increasing over time  
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Table 1:  Estimates of cost shares for Western European countries 




Becker and Guyomard (1991)  Germ./France  f 1961-84  agriculture  0.09  0.43  0.14  0.35 
Behrens and De Haen (1980)  EU  f 1970-76  agriculture  0.09  0.50  0.09  0.32 
Bonnieux (1989)  France  f 1959.83  agriculture  0.10  0.32  0.11  0.47 
Dawson and Lingard (1982)  UK  f 1974-77  dairy  0.16  0.20  0.16  0.48 
Guyomard & Vermersch (1989)  France  1981  cereals  0.19  0.31  0.18  0.33 
Henrichsmeyer et al. (1988)  EU  f 1980-85  agriculture  0.05  0.31  0.10  0.54 
Heshmati (1997)  Sweden  1988  crops  0.09  0.25  0.06  0.59 
Hockmann (1988)  EU  f 1980-84  agriculture  0.09  0.38  0.13  0.40 
Karagiannis et al. (1996)  Greece  1980  agriculture  0.14  0.38  0.24  0.24 
Kontos and Young (1983)  Greece  1980  agriculture  0.13  0.29  0.29  0.29 
Mergos and Yotopoulos (1988)  Greece  1970  livestock  0.13  0.34  0.09  0.44 
Millan (1993)  Spain  f 1962-85  agriculture  0.13  0.55  0.07  0.25 
Neunteufel (1992)  Austria  1986  agriculture  0.06  0.19  0.20  0.56 
Niendecker (1991, 1992)  Germany  1987  agriculture  0.09  0.37  0.06  0.48 
von Witzke (1979)  Germany  N.A.   agriculture  0.08  0.24  0.08  0.59 
Walo (1994)  Switzerland  1991  agriculture  0.06  0.42  0.32  0.20 
Mean        0.10  0.34  0.14  0.41 
Standard deviations        0.04  0.10  0.08  0.13 
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Table 2:  Estimates of feed demand elasticities for Western European countries 
Study  parameter  
value 
country  product  year  optimizing agent 
Bureau and Danechvar-Khaki (1995)  -1.65  France  cereals  1986  livestock producer 
Peeters (1995)  -0.67  Belgium  cereals  f 1961-1990 feed compounder 
Peeters and Surry (1993a,b)  -0.93  Belgium  cereals  1988  livestock producer + feed compounder 
  -0.76  NL  cereals  1988  livestock producer + feed compounder 
Peeters and Surry (1993c)  -0.79  Belgium  cereals  1988  feed compounder 
Peeters and Surry (1994)  -0.65  Belgium  wheat  1988  feed compounder 
  -0.69  Belgium  cereals  1988  feed compounder 
Mergos and Yotopoulos (1988)  -0.66  Greece  cereals  1970  livestock producer 
Surry and Moschini (1984)  -0.63  Belgium  cereals  f1961-1978  feed compounder 
  -0.80  NL  cereals  f 1961-1978 feed compounder 
Surry (1990)  -2.03  France  wheat  1980  livestock producer + feed compounder 
Surry (1993)  -0.25  Den., UK, Ir.  wheat  1984  livestock producer 
Mean  -0.88         
Standard deviation   0.48           47
Table 3:  Social cost of actual and optimal policy given a normal distribution of parameter values 
        95% Probability interval  75% Probability interval 
  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  from  to  from  to 
Social cost of actual policy  159.3  158.6  23.2  116.3  206.2  131.4  188.4 
Social cost of optimal policy  91.2  91.1  24.0  45.0  138.7  61.7  120.9 
Percentage improvement  0.44  0.42  0.08  0.32  0.63  0.35  0.53 
 
 
Table 4:  Social cost of actual and optimal policy given a uniform distribution of parameter values 
        95% Probability interval  75% Probability interval 
  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  from  to  from  to 
Social cost of actual policy  158.9  157.2  30.4  104.3  221.5  122.2  197.5 
Social cost of optimal policy  90.2  89.3  31.6  31.4  152.8  51.5  129.7 
Percentage improvement  0.45  0.43  0.11  0.30  0.72  0.33  0.59 
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Table 5:  Values of the coefficients of the surface response function 
Const.  Pari\j  1  aA  aB  aG  aJ  l  eA  eB  eG  eH  eK  eJ  hF  hE  sS  sF  LF  LG  LH  MCF 
  aA  0.305  -0.445  -0.030  -0.155  0.053  -0.105  0.080  -0.114  0.048  0.011  -0.002  0.045  0.003  0.119  -0.051  -1.334  -0.010  -0.294  -0.205  -0.738 
  aB  -0.388    -0.392  0.233  0.068  0.026  -0.050  0.023  -0.100  0.020  0.002  -0.003  0.035  0.005  0.045  0.049  -0.332  0.096  -0.033  -0.061 
  aG  -0.162      -0.041  0.077  0.002  0.004  0.027  0.046  -0.007  -0.010  0.020  -0.001  0.030  -0.026  -0.008  0.034  0.888  0.005  -0.115 
  aJ  0.036        -0.002  0.015  0.072  -0.181  0.009  -0.020  -0.002  0.127  -0.026  0.003  0.001  0.001  -0.016  -0.017  -0.262  0.192 
  l  -48.461          -3.706  2.371  0.837  10.275  8.301  0.186  -2.188  -2.788  0.171  0.062  0.165  0.054  0.825  0.139  111.352 
  eA  -0.020            0.038  -0.036  0.030  0.015  0.011  -0.019  0.009  -0.009  -0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  -0.013  -0.013 
  eB  -0.105              0.097  -0.031  -0.016  0.053  0.044  -0.014  0.026  -0.016  0.001  0.000  -0.003  -0.001  -0.017 
  eG  -0.021                -0.001  0.001  -0.001  0.006  0.002  0.000  -0.001  -0.002  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001 
  eH  -0.073                  -0.003  -0.010  -0.001  0.015  0.006  -0.002  -0.003  -0.004  0.000  0.000  0.003 
7.058  eK  -0.042                    -0.002  0.000  -0.003  0.029  -0.003  0.000  -0.001  -0.015  0.001  0.001 
  eJ  -0.109                      -0.009  0.000  0.001  0.079  -0.002  0.000  -0.001  -0.034  0.005 
  hF  1.994                        0.117  -0.041  -0.006  -1.429  -0.110  -0.003  0.052  0.141 
  hE  0.493                          -0.046  0.024  0.003  -0.182  -0.093  0.013  -0.028 
  sS  -0.052                            0.054  0.047  0.003  0.004  0.010  -0.010 
  sF  -1.886                              -0.296  0.091  0.044  0.391  0.196 
  LF  -4.096                                -0.303  0.138  0.065  0.754 
  LG  -0.278                                  0.003  0.031  0.030 
  LH  -0.579                                    -0.023  0.047 
  MCF  1.162                                      0.043   49
Table 6: Significance of the coefficients of the surface response function 
Const.  Pari\j  1  aA  aB  aG  aJ  l  eA  eB  eG  eH  eK  eJ  hF  hE  sS  sF  LF  LG  LH  MCF 
  aA  +  +++    +    +++  +++  +++  +      +++    +++    +        + 
  aB  +++    +++  +++  +    +++  ++  +++  +    +  +++  ++  +++  +    +     
  aG  +      +  +      +++  +++      +++    +++  +++      +     
  aJ              +  +++    ++    +++  +++  +      +      ++ 
  l  +++          +++  +++  +++  +++  +++  +++  +++  +++  +++  +++  +++  +++  +++    +++ 
  eA              +++  +++  ++    +++  +++  +++  +          +++  + 
  eB  +++              +++  +++  +++  +++  +++  +++  +++  +++  +    +++  +++  +++ 
  eG  +++                +    +  +++  +++    +++  +++      +++  +++ 
  eH  +++                  +++  +++    +++  +++  +++  +++  +++    +++  +++ 
+++  eK  +++                    +++    +++  +++  +++  +  +++  +++  +++  +++ 
  eJ  +++                      +++      +++  +++    ++  +++  +++ 
  hF  +++                        +++  +++    +++  +++  +  +++  +++ 
  hE  +++                          +++  +++    +++  +++  +++  +++ 
  sS  +++                            +++  +++      +++  +++ 
  sF  +++                              +++  +++  +++  +++  +++ 
  LF  +++                                +++  +++  +++  +++ 
  LG  +++                                    +  + 
  LH  +++                                    +  ++ 
  MCF  +++                                      +++ 
+++ represents a 99% significance level, ++ represents a 95% significance level, + represents a 90% significance level,   50
Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis 
  Monte Carlo-results (n=9500)  Evaluation at parameter means 
Par.  Mean  Median S.E.  Min Max Avg. RSCmin  RSCmax D D(RSC) 
aA  -0.007  -0.005 0.018  -0.092 0.055 -0.006 0.418  0.417 -0.001 
aB  -0.035  -0.033 0.055  -0.245 0.168 -0.036 0.420  0.415 -0.004 
aG  -0.001  -0.002 0.018  -0.064 0.087 -0.002 0.418  0.417 0.000 
aJ   0.015  0.015 0.021  -0.059 0.105 0.015 0.417  0.419 0.002 
l  -1.106
*** -1.187 0.277  -1.588 0.118 -1.232 0.494  0.364 -0.130 
eA   0.000  0.000 0.005  -0.028 0.027 0.000 0.418  0.417 0.000 
eB  -0.016  -0.012 0.032  -0.153 0.094 -0.015 0.419  0.411 -0.008 
eG  -0.019  -0.023 0.015  -0.049 0.059 -0.029 0.431  0.415 -0.016 
eH  -0.054  -0.064 0.034  -0.129 0.136 -0.078 0.453  0.409 -0.044 
eK  -0.016  -0.018 0.024  -0.080 0.102 -0.023 0.428  0.415 -0.013 
eJ  -0.011  -0.011 0.014  -0.061 0.055 -0.015 0.424  0.415 -0.009 
hF  -0.109  -0.098 0.078  -0.366 0.225 -0.132 0.388  0.466 0.079 
hE  -0.176  -0.158 0.108  -0.539 0.076 -0.177 0.374  0.448 0.074 
sS   0.005  0.005 0.012  -0.069 0.073 0.007 0.414  0.419 0.005 
sF  -0.538
*** -0.543 0.138  -1.028 0.123 -0.644 0.603  0.332 -0.271 
LF  -1.023
**  -1.058 0.417  -2.116 0.604 -1.124 0.478  0.372 -0.106 
LG  -0.007  -0.012 0.032  -0.088 0.125 -0.013 0.419  0.417 -0.001 
LH  -0.019  -0.029 0.074  -0.225 0.317 -0.031 0.420  0.417 -0.003 
MCF   0.107
**  0.101 0.054  -0.068 0.287 0.118 0.389  0.448 0.059 
*, 
**, 
*** indicate a significance level of 90%, 95%, and 99%, respectively.   51
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Figure 2:  Social cost of actual and optimal policy 
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